Governança da capacidade ferroviária: proposta de oferta pública de capacidade para integração entre concessões, autorizações e ATF'S

Abstract

The Brazilian railway sector is undergoing its most significant institutional transformation since privatization in the mid-1990s. The consolidation of three decades of concessions, early renewals in the current decade, the railway authorization regime, and the emergence of Railway Transport Operators (Agentes Transportadores Ferroviários – ATFs)—which, in fact, represent a rebranding of the Independent Railway Operator (Operador Ferroviário Independente – OFI), introduced in 2014 under Resolution No. 4,348/2014 of the National Land Transport Agency (Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres – ANTT), now revoked—have broadened opportunities for infrastructure expansion, diversification of economic players, and greater competitiveness in freight rail transport. Nevertheless, this evolution remains limited and lacks a model for the optimized use of railway operational capacity. This article proposes the establishment of a National Railway Capacity Governance framework (Governança Nacional da Capacidade Ferroviária – GNCF), structured around six pillars: transparency, process, evidence-based planning, institutional integration, Public Railway Capacity Offering (Oferta Pública de Capacidade Ferroviária – OPCF), and continuous monitoring. The proposal is operationalized through the Railway Saturation Index (Índice de Saturação Ferroviária – ISF)—referred to by ANTT as the Railway Segment Saturation Level (Nível de Saturação do Segmento Ferroviário – NSSF)—the Consolidated Railway Saturation Index (Índice de Saturação Ferroviária Consolidado – ISFC), Commercially Available Capacity (Capacidade Comercialmente Disponível – CCD), Strategic Railway Capacity Reserve (Reserva Estratégica de Capacidade Ferroviária – RECF), and Railway Capacity Regulatory Contract (Contrato Regulatório de Capacidade Ferroviária – CRCF), incorporating antitrust safeguards against the strategic withholding of capacity and excessive pricing. The conceptual validation draws on evidence from the Paulista Railway Network (Malha Paulista), based on data from 2023, 2024, and 2025, demonstrating the model's usefulness in distinguishing cyclical from structural bottlenecks, calibrating capacity supply, and guiding regulatory and investment decisions. The study further substantiates the proposal's feasibility through legal and regulatory foundations, economic and financial modeling, objective allocation rules, data governance, real-time arbitration of operational conflicts, and a phased implementation plan designed to support the adaptation and maturation of the proposed framework. The article's central thesis is that railway infrastructure is a physical asset, whereas railway capacity is a regulatory asset for the State and an economic asset for the market. Recognizing this distinction enables Brazil to move beyond a policy focused exclusively on the physical expansion of its railway network toward a national railway capacity governance policy capable of enhancing efficiency, competition, interoperability, and economic rationality throughout the National Railway System.